U.S.A. DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION to Lt. Col. J.R. STONE 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry |
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AWARD of MILITARY MEDAL to Cpl. S. DOUGLAS 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry |
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AWARD of DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL to Pte. W.R. MITCHELL 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry |
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hortly after the Battle of Kapyong in Korea, in April of 1951, the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), along with an Australian battalion and a company of a U.S. Tank battalion were honoured by the U.S. Government with the award of the highly esteemed Distinguished Unit Citation. The award was made to Lt. Col. J.R. Stone, the Battalion C.O., by the Army Commander, General James Van Fleet, at a brief ceremony held on November 5th of that same year. The award was in recognition of the "Pat's" heroic stand in halting a major breakthrough of the U.N. lines by overwhelming forces of the Chinese 3rd Field Army.
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he Korean War, for some unfathomable reason, was not officially recognized as a war until fairly recently, having been hung with the somewhat inglorious title of 'Police Action', began with a surprise rush of North Korean Communist Divisions across the 38th Parallel on the morning of June 25, 1950. The 38th Parallel signified the dividing line between Communist North Korea and the Democratic Republic of South Korea.
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he North Korean armoured fists slammed their way through unprepared South Korean troops (hereafter described as ROK units). In chaotic disarray, the ROK divisions began a massive pull-back, suffering heavy casualties as they abandoned their positions.
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he first American unit to go into action against the North Koreans was the 24th Infantry Division based in Japan. One battalion arrived in C-54 transports and was rushed up to the front 22 miles below Seoul, the Nation's Capitol. Their baptism into battle was a rough one. The young Yanks simply were not prepared for what they had been thrust into. The Americans were not only ill-disciplined, they were poorly trained, poorly led, their weapons were largely obsolete, and they had insufficient ammunition stocks to sustain them in prolonged action. They simply were no match for the hardened and dedicated troops of the North Korean People's Army. Their first confrontations turned into sorry shambles of defeat.
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owever, if anything positive can be said about their poor performance, their mistakes, their lack of fighting ability, even their doubtful will to stand up to the pressures of the situation, the 24th Division still managed to slow the momentum of the communist juggernaut.
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hile the 24th was going through the hell of a fighting withdrawal, the American Command was frantically assembling Divisions in Japan and stateside to rush to Korea to save what had all the earmarks of a military debacle. The first of the new units to arrive at the front was the 1st Cavalry Division, followed close behind by the 25th and 7th Infantry Divisions. Like the 24th Infantry Division, these new formations were no better in fighting trim when the enemy struck their posit-ions. Glaring weaknesses showed everywhere. The troops too were not equipped, trained, or mentally hardened for battle. As a result, their performance was, in many instances, even poorer than that of the bloodied 24th. The whole front was inexorably being pushed southwards towards what soon became known as 'the Pusan Perimeter'. Here the Americans and the ROK Divisions would "Stand or Die', as newly-arrived Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker had more or less put it to the troops.
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nce in the tight little box of the Pusan Perimeter, with all units anchored in prepared positions, where the front line was continuous, where the terrain around them was known and much easier to defend, the Americans began to fight the way they were capable of fighting. The turnaround in military fortunes came in mid-September. Stopping cold the North Koreans' attacks on the Perimeter at a number of points, Marine units which had arrived in the nick of time began a push of their own and drove the enemy back into the low hills overlooking the perimeter.
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eanwhile, the drive to push the Communist armies out of Seoul began on Sept. 15/16 with the amphibious landing at Inchon on the west coast. The 20 mile drive to the capitol was made against spotty but often tough resistance until the Marines entered Seoul where heavy street fighting took place. The city was liberated on the 28th of September.
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hough combat losses around the Pusan Perimeter had been heavy, arriving divisions and smaller combat units soon brought the United Nations' manpower strength to a 2 to 1 superiority, and a 5 to 1 in firepower. The stage was now set for the big push out of the perimeter with the intention of driving the NKPA back over the 38th Parallel separating the South from the North. The attack began on the bleak, rainy morning of September 15th. For the first three days the fighting was bitter, with little encouraging progress having been made. And then on the 4th day the North Koreans began to crack. Their divisions began disengaging, followed soon after by a rapidly accelerating withdrawal. The retreat to the 38th Parallel was on full tilt.
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s often happens in war, Victory springs suddenly out of what had every aspect of being total defeat, and it happened in that late summer of 1950 in Korea. So abrupt was the turnaround that it electrified the American Command and astounded the world at large. The broken North Korean Army streamed northwards, not in controlled retreat, but more like a rabble. By October 7th American units of the Eighth Army crossed the 38th Parallel but did not stop there. A directive from the Pentagon, with President Truman's concurrence came into General Douglas McArthur's hand giving him full freedom to proceed tactically and strategically across the Parallel. Meanwhile, ROK troops had crossed the line only days before.
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hough the people at the topmost level of U.S. Military Command, right up to the President himself, gave little or no thought to the possibility of the Chinese coming into the conflict, the time drew near when this strategic move by the Chinese communists would occur. Across the full breadth of the Korean Peninsula the combined ROK divisions and the Eighth Army under Gen. Walton Walker surged into the mountains north of the Parallel. The lOth U.S. Corps, as directed by McArthur, operated independently on the east coast and was separated from the main force by a range of lofty mountains, a wild region of rugged slopes and deep gorges where even the North Koreans would dare not go. A gap of some 60 miles existed between the two formations, which made for an extremely dangerous situation no top level commanders should have overlooked. The farther the lead elements pushed into the trackless wastes, the more isolated the point battalions found themselves. The narrow valleys and dirt roads, not much better than cart tracks were ideal for ambush and encirclement. But the push went on.
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eanwhile, Chinese armies had been moving across the Yalu River from Manchuria at an accelerating pace since the second week of October, and by the end of the month over 300,000 troops in their peculiar padded battledress and their winter Melton caps waited in the cold, windswept valleys close up against the wide but shallow Yalu River.
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irst contact with this still undetected huge force was made on or about Oct.25th. In the next couple of days more and more Chinese appeared on the front opposite a ROK division. And then the first of several traps were sprung. Ghost battalions of Chinese swept down on the ROKs from out of the hills, the ravines and the gullies, setting up roadblocks behind them and fanning out deep into their rear where their unexpected appearance threw the South Koreans into wholesale panic. The point units' road discipline fell apart under the impetuous rush of Chinese infantry sweeping through and around them. But this was onIy the hint of what was soon to take place.
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rom the 26th to the end of the month there was nothing but turmoil in the ROK command, as report after report came through of 'wipe-outs', of road-blocks everywhere, of units being encircled, of extremely heavy fighting all across the front. A whole ROK Division within the space of a few hours was destroyed. A disaster was in the making and to the 'high brass' it looked very much like nothing could be done to prevent it. Fire-fights between sections, platoons, and even on a Brigade level spread rapidly all across the Eighth Army front. American units far forward of the main bulk of the army found themselves attacked from all sides.
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here was no doubt about it, but the Eighth Army had suffered a severe mauling in this their first major contact with the Chinese Communist Forces under General Lin Piao. By November 7th however, the Chinese disappeared from the front as suddenly as they had appeared. Their surprise and devastating entry into the war might have only been a signal to the U.N. troops to back off, to halt their movement towards the Yalu River. If it was only that, then it appears as though McArthur and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff chose to ignore it. Although slowed by the terrain, the bitterly cold weather and the poor network of roads, the army lumbered slowly northwards.
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n the morning of November 24th, what was thought to be the big push to end the war, jumped off with everything going well, at first. And then on the next night bugles sounded in the valleys. They were Chinese bugles. Like ghosts sweeping in from out of misty swamps, Chinese infantry in small groups of about a dozen, and, in some cases, groups of company size, swirled through and around American and ROK strong points in the central highlands on the approaches to the Chosin Reservoir. Where breakthroughs were pushed home, Chinese commanders poured their men into the gaps. Another big retreat was underway.
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he Marines' pullback from positions around the Chosin Reservoir all the way to the escape port at Hungnam on the east coast was an epic one of incredible bravery, of endurance under extreme hardship, of splendid co-operation between air and ground forces, and an unbreakable spirit and will to push on when all seemed hopeless. Like Dunkirk, the Marines and other units were lifted off to fight another day. Meanwhile, the Eighth Army divisions and U.S. 10th Corps pulled back out of the dangerous mountains and set up holding positions at or close to the 38th Parallel.
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he Chinese bludgeon landed again with heavy force in a New Year's Eve offensive all along the line, but mainly aimed in the direction of Seoul. This drive was delivered with even greater sustained force than their drive of the month before and soon had the U.N. line crumbling again. After extremely heavy fighting in some sectors and wholesale panic in other areas, the communists retook Seoul. The momentum of the massive attack carried the lead elements some 60 miles below the Capitol. By January 2nd the U.N. line was established all across the peninsula, anchored on the west at Pyongyakk and on the east at Samchok.
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nce again, however, Eighth Army and 10th Corps began a slow, probing move northward. Here and there they ran into stiff opposition, but in the more open country of South Korea below Seoul, the Chinese and North Koreans were not able to bring into play their, by now all too familiar, tactics of surprise and infiltration. Their sudden 'cut and thrust' and night time human wave assaults proved to be ineffective against the superior firepower of the American artillery, mortars, tanks, and air-support. It was a killing ground from which the Communists had to withdraw or risk annihilation. They broke contact and slowly pulled their forces back over the 38th Parallel.
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hile this was happening, far to the north, reinforcements were being rushed across the Yalu from Manchuria. Night after night, under the cover of darkness, swarms of Chinese crossed the river and made their way southwards to a concentration area southeast of Sariwon in western Korea. That such a massive assembly of troops went undetected in the days leading up to the offensive was testimony to the Chinese skill at camouflage. On the night of April 23, 1951 the Battle of Kapyong was about to begin, the battle out of which came the U.S. government's award to the P.P.C.L.I. of the Distinguished Unit Citation.
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he 27th Commonwealth Brigade comprising the 2nd P.P.C.L.L, the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment, and the British 1st Middlesex were in Corps reserve when the Chinese and North Koreans struck with telling effect shortly before midnight on the 23rd. As it turned out, the positions held by the three battalions of the Commonwealth Brigade were ideal for protecting the escape route down which the South Koreans retreated following their collapse under the Chinese onslaught. All four companies of the P.P.C.L.I were firmly dug-in on Hill 677 overlooking the 2800 metre wide valley of the Kapyong River, a river with many abrupt twists and turns. Somewhat lower down the slope was a company of the Middlesex, while across the valley to their immediate right, Hill 504 was occupied by the Royal Australian Regiment and one company of the 72nd U.S. Tank Battalion.
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ollowing close on the heels of the retiring ROK troops the cutting edge of the Chinese forces sliced into the Australians on the night of April 23/24. Here, however, they had run up against a sterner foe and soon became embroiled in an all-night battle losing men at a rapid rate. Only their numbers enabled them to continue the pressure against the Aussies, and when large groups of the Chinese infiltrated into the valley below them to the south the Australians were forced to withdraw. This left the front and the right flank of the Patricias' wide open to attack. The Canadians braced themselves for the 'blow' they knew would soon be coming. A breakthrough here in the valley of the Kapyong would threaten the whole U.N. line with collapse. Lt. Col. Stone, C.O. of the Pats, seeing the growing threat on his right flank, shifted 'B' company from the left of the Regiment's defences to the right to close the back door where the greatest threat seemed to exist. Now, with the valley below them fairly swarming with Chinese, the Canadians hunkering down in their individual slit-trenches and weapons' positions were disposed as follows:
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ut under the conditions such as they were, no company could be considered as being in reserve. The enemy was on three sides, and some had even slipped in behind the Regiment's hilltop positions.
B
aker company, shifting across the hill from the left to the right, came under fire of American tanks from across the Kapyong but came out of it unscathed until they stumbled into a network of #36 grenades strung with trip-wires across the front of Tac H.Q. One man was killed, and when a second grenade lay smoking in the midst of the platoon, Cpl. S. Douglas, without hesitation grabbed it up to throw it clear. It exploded in his hand, blowing it off, but his heroic action saved the platoon. For his selfless act to save the platoon Cpl. S. Douglas was awarded the Military Medal.
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rom their new positions overlooking the valley of the Kapyong, at a point where the river curved in a wide bend towards them, Baker company men had a grandstand view of the Chinese building up for the assault. That it would come in the darkness was a foregone conclusion. As the shadows gathering in the valley cloaked activity to their front, the men of Baker company, in individual slit-trenches and weapons posts, braced themselves for the inrush of Chinese. But it wasn't until 10:00 p.m. that the show began with mortars whuffling in all over the hill. And then three heavy machine-guns opened up, firing tracers from long range as a directional means for assault. The first attack came at 11:00 p.m. to the usual blare of bugles and the shrillness of whistles. Some 200 Chinese came charging up the slope in shouting frenzy but were driven back by the coordinated fire of 5 and 6 platoons. One section of 6 platoon had been overrun but the Chinese were later driven back and the position retaken. Battalion mortars, along with the battalion heavy and light machine guns stopped the Chinese just yards from the perimeter.
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hile the attack was going on against "B" company, about a 100 Chinese somehow worked their way through interlacing machine-gun fire and got dangerously close to Tac H.Q. before being thrown back by battalion 81 mm mortars firing from just 200 yards away at maximum elevation, in concert with the devastating fire of the 50 cal. MGs. This attack was followed shortly afterwards by an attempt by an even larger body of the enemy to seize the hill. Once again the Chinese walked into a heavy concentration of artillery as they sought to ford the Kapyong River.
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uring the attacks on "B" company that night, every man stood taller than he had ever stood before. To stick it out in the face of a howling mass of crazed enemy took courage far beyond the ordinary. One young man, Bren-gunner Pte. W.R. Mitchell, stood even a little taller. In the first wild charge, it was largely Mitchell behind his Bren that repulsed the enemy. Though wounded in the chest early in the battle, Mitchell continued fighting, moving from trench to trench, all the while firing his Bren from the hip. He was wounded a second time but stayed to fight all through the night. Finally at daybreak when he could hardly stand through loss of blood he was evacuated by helicopter. This display of courage of the highest order earned Pte. W.R. Mitchell the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
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he assault against "B" company, as sharp and sustained as it was, proved to be only a diversionary one. The focal point of the enemy effort was the salient held by "Dog" company on the northwest slope of Hill 677. Because of their exposed position the company faced attacks by large bodies of troops from two sides. The human wave of attackers, though suffering heavy casualties, carried through in places and overran one platoon area killing the crew of a 50 cal. M.G. On trying to turn this gun on the Canadians, the attackers were rebuffed by a Bren-gunner zeroing in on the position. Heavy artillery fire called down on top of their own positions by Capt. J.G.W. Mills, a decision which saved the day. Though frustrated in their frenzied attempts to close with the Canadians by the sheer weight of the shells falling amongst them, the Chinese persisted in their attacks. Daylight finally brought relief from the insane rushes of large groups of Chinese at almost every quarter of the Battalion hilltop positions. And, though the attackers eventually broke off, shellfire continued to harass the companies all through the day.
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he Patricias were cut off from the rest of the Brigade, and with the only supply route to the rear in enemy hands and their ammunition and rations running dangerously low, it was obvious to everyone with fingers on triggers that unless supplies were air-dropped onto their positions before night-fall the Regiment would be in serious trouble should the Chinese launch another assault with the same intensity as the ones they had turned aside. Lt. Col. Stone radioed to the command above him that he had to have an air drop. Ammunition was now dangerously low, along with food and other supplies. Permission to do so had to go through the chain of command and thence across to the air supply base in Japan. Six hours later four C119 cargo aircraft dropped the supplies smack on the money except for four chutes that went astray. However, the emergency supplies were not put to use as the Chinese had decided they had had enough on the Kapyong, and chose to push their attacks elsewhere in the search for a soft spot in the U.N. lines.
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he Battle of Kapyong was over.
Editor's Note: This story of the Battle of Kapyong and commendations was written and submitted by Stan Scislowski
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